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Velazquez v. Legal Services Corporation:
Unconstitutional Conditions and First Amendment
Rights of Nonprofit Organizations and Their Donors
Edward Chaney*
INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit corporation Language for Life1 is a hypothetical
English as a Second Language program funded by a mixture of
foundation grants, individual donations, and state and federal
contracts.2 Believing that English proficiency is an important skill
for all, Language for Life has adopted a policy of non-
discrimination against undocumented persons in the provision of its
services. In fact, it does not even ascertain the citizenship status of
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2007.
1. This is a hypothetical scenario created to illustrate the topic of this
Note. Language for Life and the federal grant it receives are both fictitious;
however, these are real issues being faced by nonprofit organizations across
the country.
2. A report by the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, an independent group,
states:
Though funding for individual organizations varies
substantially, the majority of support for the
[nonprofit] sector as a whole comes from consumers of
services and voluntary contributions: 38% from dues,
fees, and other charges for goods and services, 17%
from individual contributions, and an additional 3%
from private foundations and corporate giving
programs. Government grants and contracts provide
31% of the sector's revenues, and other sources, such
as income from assets, supply the remaining 11%.
INDEPENDENT SECTOR, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS 12 (2005), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/
PanelFinalReport.pdf.
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its students. Census projections show that the population of
immigrants with limited or no English proficiency could grow by as
much as 25% in the next five years; and, in response, the federal
government has increased the funds available to Language for Life
and similar programs through its primary grants program.
However, the grant now requires a new restriction that none of its
funds may be used to provide services to undocumented persons.
Furthermore, the federal government requires that if a grantee does
serve such a population, even with non-federal funds received from
individual donors, then it must do so as a completely separate legal
entity, in separate facilities with no shared equipment, and may
only share some of its staff. Language for Life calculates that this
condition will require an additional $100,000 a year to create and
maintain this separate organization at its current scale. Funding
dollars are scarce as it is; in the past, the organization has never
been able to increase its income from private sources by more than
10% from year to year. Refusing the federal grant would decrease
the current budget by approximately 30%, eliminating one-quarter
of current program activity. Such a move would impact all
students, not just undocumented immigrants, as well as foreclose
any growth to meet the impending spike in demand.
Language for Life decides to contact its major donors to
assess the viability of creating the separate organization. As a
reliable donor, you receive a letter from Language for Life. You
have been supporting the organization for four years through gifts
from your personal funds. You are a strong believer in the
organization's undocumented persons policy and are furious at the
repercussions of the new restrictions. You believe that the
organization's First Amendment free speech protections are being
trampled. Upon further reflection, you believe that your First
Amendment rights are being trampled too.
Are you right?
The answer is unclear due to the unsettled and somewhat
confusing body of law of unconstitutional conditions.3 However,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals must grapple with this
essential question when it decides the appeal to Velazquez v. Legal
3. See infra notes 32-33, 56-59 and accompanying text.
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Services Corporation (Velazquez IV).4 In Velazquez IV, the district
court enjoined Legal Services Corporation ("LSC")5 from strictly
enforcing its program integrity requirements as a condition to the
grants made to several New York legal services organizations.6
These program integrity requirements are similar to the restrictions
in the above hypothetical.7 In the court's analysis, the requirements
placed an undue burden on the protected First Amendment right to
speech of the grantee organizations.8 On appeal, the defendant-
appellant, Legal Services Corporation, and the intervener-
appellant, the U.S. Government, asserted in essence that the
plaintiffs "can avoid the restrictions by simply refusing the subsidy" 9
and that the federal government may contract as it sees fit provided
4. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F. Supp. 2d 566
(E.D.N.Y. 2004), order modified by Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 356 F.
Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). There are four, soon to be five, decisions
containing both of the names "Velazquez" and "Legal Services Corporation,"
all stemming from the same set of facts. One issue in the case worked its way
to the Supreme Court. A different set of issues, including the subject of this
note, is now the subject of appeal. Oral arguments were heard in November
2005. As of yet, the Court has not issued a decision. See infra Part I.
5. LSC is the organization that distributes federal grant dollars to
nonprofit legal services agencies. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying
text.
6. The plaintiffs submitted a "Clarified Proposal" to the court proposing
a structure of separation that they argued "would not impose an undue
burden." Velazquez IV, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 574. However, LSC rejected this
proposal, arguing that it did not satisfy the program integrity requirements.
Id. at 577-78. The court sided with the plaintiffs. Id. at 613.
7. Similarities include the separation requirements. For more detail on
the program integrity requirements, see infra text accompanying notes 19-27.
8. Velazquez IV, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 610-13. In balancing the
government's interests against the rights of the plaintiffs, the court sided with
the plaintiffs and their Clarified Proposal, noting, inter alia, that "[t]here is
simply no legitimate justification for requiring duplication of costs." Id. at 612.
First Amendment claims in the context of nonprofit corporations have
appeared several times in the United States Supreme Court. See infra notes
33, 118-123 and accompanying text.
9. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 39, Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp.,
No. 05-0340 (2d Cir. May 27, 2005).
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that in so doing recipients are left with "'adequate alternative
channels of protected expression.'' 0
The impact that this case may have on the nonprofit sector
is profound and is not going unnoticed. Many of the sector's
leading institutions have filed a joint amicus brief." The
Independent Sector, a "leadership forum for charities, foundations,
and corporate giving programs committed to advancing the
common good in America and around the world,"'2 has sounded the
alarm, stating that Velazquez
will have far-reaching implications that go well
beyond the funding of legal services, to the core
principles and rights of private giving, private
action by charitable nonprofit organizations,
and the right to advocate by 501(c)(3)
organizations with their private funds,
regardless of whether they receive government
funding. Given the prevalence of government
funding for 501(c)(3) organizations in the arts,
human services, education, health care,
research, international assistance and virtually
every type of nonprofit charitable activity, the
implications of outcomes of these cases cannot
be understated.
3
10. Id. at 41 (quoting Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez II), 164
F.3d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1999)).
11. Brief for Amici Curiae, Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 05-0340
(2d Cir. July 6, 2005). Amici curiae include the Independent Sector, Council
on Foundations, National Council of Nonprofit Associations, Open Society
Institute, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, and
many other private and community foundations.
12. Independent Sector, About Us, http://www.Independentsector.org
/about/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). The Independent Sector's stature among
policy makers is significant. In 2004, leaders of the Senate Finance Committee
encouraged the Independent Sector to convene a sector-wide discussion on
nonprofit governance and accountability and to report its findings. Press
Release, Independent Sector, Senate Finance Committee Invites Sector-Wide
Input to Improve Governance and Practice (Oct. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.independentsector.org/media/sector-panel.html.
13. Independent Sector, Legal Services Challenges: An Important
Advocacy Issue for the Nonprofit Community, http://www.independent
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Recent congressional action lends credence to such claims.
The House of Representatives attached conditions to a recent
housing funding initiative that would
extend the current ban on the use of federal
funds for lobbying and certain electioneering
activities to private funds as well. The proposed
restrictions are so broad that any charitable
organization that has within the previous 12
months engaged in nonpartisan election
activities - including voter registration and
education, assisting voters to apply for absentee
ballots, or providing voters transportation to
the polls - would be ineligible for grants from
the new Affordable Housing Fund. The
proposal would also prohibit non-profit
grantees from engaging in any of these
activities in the future, even with private
funding. In addition, even nonprofits that do
not engage in such activities would be
disqualified for grants simply if they are
affiliated with an organization that engages in
such activities.1
4
Until the law is settled, there will likely be more litigation,
inspired by both Velazquez IV and efforts of Congress to tie what it
sees as desirable restrictions to federal grants and subsidies to
various nonprofits. This Note uses the current Velazquez appeal
(hereinafter Velazquez V) as a lens through which to examine
questions on the law of unconstitutional conditions that will
sector.org/programs/gr/velazquez.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006); see also
Madeline Lee, Why I'm Suing the Federal Government, FOUND. NEWS &
COMMENT., (May-June 2002), available at http://www.foundationnews.org/
CME/article.cfm?ID=1953 (describing New York Foundation's interest in
Velazquez and why other philanthropic organizations should care about its
outcome).
14. Independent Sector, Advocacy Rights Threatened in Affordable
Housing Legislation, http://www.independentsector.org/programs/gr/housing
advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
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confront the courts in such cases. Part I presents the procedural
history of Velazquez V and explores the issues and facts in greater
detail. Additionally, Part I sets out the First Amendment argument
by nonprofit organizations challenging the program integrity
requirements. Part II examines the debate over the standard of
review for unconstitutional conditions cases and its origin by
focusing on two cases where the Supreme Court has found
"permissible non-subsidies." Part III critically analyzes the
differences between unconstitutional conditions and permissible
non-subsidies. Part IV proposes a clarified standard of review,
whereby the court balances the government's interest against the
First Amendment rights of the donor and the nonprofit
organization, and its impact on the organization's ability to serve as
a traditional sphere of free expression. Finally, this Note concludes
by applying the proposed standard to Velazquez V and finds that
the program integrity requirements excessively burden the First
Amendment rights of the donor and the nonprofit organization.
I. VELAZQUEZ V. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Congress chartered Legal Services Corporation as a
"private nonmembership nonprofit" 5 to provide "financial support
for legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to
persons financially unable to afford legal assistance. 1 6 LSC acts as
a grantmaking entity distributing federal dollars on an annual basis
to qualified agencies. 7 In fiscal year 2003-2004, LSC's budget was
$335.3 million, supporting nearly 3,700 attorneys and staffing 143
programs that handle approximately one million cases and four
million 'matters,' such as community education training and legal
self-help seminars.' 8 In 1996, responding to political pressure to
15. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996b(a) (2000).
16. Id.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f (detailing, inter alia, the requisites for receiving
funding and limitations on its use).
18. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, 6
(2004), available at http://www.Isc.gov/about/pdfs/AnnualReport2003-2004.
pdf.
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rein in if not terminate LSC, 19 Congress tacked on additional
restrictions as to how agencies could use LSC grant dollars.
20
Congress took these restrictions a step further by applying them to
activities funded from any other non-federal source.2' Thus, a legal
aid agency that received any amount of LSC funding was banned
from using any private or non-federal governmental dollars to
engage in any activities prohibited by Congress. After some
struggle with the constitutional implications of such a condition,
2 2
LSC codified these new restrictions into its present program
integrity requirements.23
Current LSC regulations provide that a "recipient may not
use non-LSC funds for any purpose prohibited by the LSC Act...
unless such use is authorized by [additional regulations]. 24  The
program integrity requirements enforce this rule by requiring that
the grant recipient have "objective integrity and independence from
any organization that engages in restricted activities., 25  This
requirement entails a three part test requiring the organization
engaging in restricted activity to: (1) be a separate legal entity; (2)
receive no transfer of LSC funds or subsidy from the grantee; and,
26(3) be physically and financially separate. Whether the
organization is physically and financially separate is determined on
a case-by-case basis, but nonexclusive factors may include separate
personnel, separate accounting and time keeping records, the
19. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Boehm & Peter T. Flaherty, Why the Legal
Services Corporation Must Be Abolished, HERITAGE FOUND.
BACKGROUNDER, (Oct. 18, 1995), available at http://new.heritage.org/
Research/LegalIssues/BG1057.cfm.
20. Omnibus Consolidated Rescission and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). A good example of an imposed
restriction is the prohibition of grantees in the initiation or participation in
class action lawsuits. § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 1321-53.
21. § 504(d)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 1321-56.
22. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez II), 164 F.3d 757,
759-61 (2d Cir. 1999), affd, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
23. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.3 & 1610.8 (2005).
24. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.3.
25. 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8(a).
26. Id.
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degree in separation of facilities, and distinguishing signage and
27other forms of identification.
28A group of legal aid providers attacked the
constitutionality of the program integrity requirements on theirf 29
face, alleging that they violated the First Amendment right to free
expression both by denying "a meaningful opportunity for LSC
recipients to engage in restricted activities using non-LSC funds," 3
and by being so broad as to inhibit constitutionally protected
speech. 3' The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the
''government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. 3 2 Prior to this challenge, the United
States Supreme Court had applied this doctrine in the context of a
federal grant to a nonprofit corporation.3 ' However, the plaintiffs
lost in district courtM as the program integrity requirements were
27. Id.
28. Plaintiffs in the original suit included Farmworker Legal Services of
New York, Inc., and individual legal aid attorneys. Velazquez v. Legal Servs.
Corp. (Velazquez 1), 985 F. Supp. 323, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). Carmen
Velazquez, for whom the case is named, was a legal aid client who wished to
be represented in a class action suit, one of the activities restricted by LSC
funding. Id.
29. In a facial challenge, a plaintiff "must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the
regulations] might operate unconstitutionally under some circumstances is
insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
183 (1991) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
30. Velazquez I, 985 F. Supp. at 338 (quoting Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum at 2). The Velazquez case actually began before the final
codification of the program integrity requirements. See Velazquez v. Legal
Servs. Corp. (Velazquez II), 164 F.3d 757, 759-61 (2d Cir. 1999). But even
after the revision, the plaintiffs maintained their attack. Id.
31. Velazquez I, 985 F. Supp. at 340-41.
32. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (holding
that IRS code restricting lobbying activity does not create such a denial of
benefit).
33. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984)
(holding that a grant condition restricting editorializing was unconstitutional).
See infra text accompanying notes 71-77.
34. Id. at 344.
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similar to ones that survived a prior facial challenge in Rust v.
Sullivan upholding restrictions on abortion related services
attached to federal funding." The district court found that the
program integrity requirements were a permissible construction of
Congress' intentions to insure separation between a grantee and an• . 36
organization conducting restricted activities, and could not
"plausibly be perceived as having such a preclusive effect upon the
exercise of the plaintiffs' or third parties' First Amendment
rights. 37 On appeal, the plaintiffs continued their facial attack,
arguing that the burdens placed on their protected rights of speech
by the regulations "amount[ed] to an unconstitutional condition on
the receipt of LSC subsidies., 38 In Velazquez v. Legal Services
Corp. (Velazquez 11), 9 the Second Circuit dismissed this claim, 4
stating that "Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of
recipients of government benefits if the recipients are left with
adequate alternative channels for protected expression. 4 ' But, the
court's result all but invited an as-applied challenge to the
restrictions on the use of non-federal funds as an unconstitutional
condition to the receipt of federal funds. This as-applied challenge
35. 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see infra text accompanying notes 82-95.
36. Velazquez I, 985 F. Supp. at 338-39.
37. Id. at 342.
38. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez II), 164 F.3d 757, 765 (2d
Cir. 1999).
39. Id. at 757.
40. Id. at 765-67.
41. Id. at 766. The court provided two examples of "adequate channels"
from Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540
(1983), and FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364
(1984). See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
42. As opposed to the broad attack of a facial challenge, see supra note
27, the as-applied attack is narrowed to the facts at hand: "[O]ne to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (citations omitted). Likewise, a
holding in a successful as-applied challenge will "never... formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
be applied." Id. Thus, a successful facial challenge will wholly invalidate a
regulation; an as-applied challenge will only strike its fact-specific application.
275
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would likely be successful provided that a grantee could show that
the "restrictions unduly burden[ed] its capacity to engage in
protected First Amendment activity. 4 ' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on a different question in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez (Velazquez 111),4 ignoring the Second Circuit's specific
holding and dictum concerning the restrictions on non-federal
funds, leaving open the lower court's invitation.
In Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp. (Velazquez IV),45 the
original plaintiffs and a group of private donors accepted the
invitation to challenge the program integrity requirements as-
applied. At first blush, it is easy to see how the program integrity
requirements survived a facial First Amendment challenge.
Nonprofit organizations often have affiliated 501 (c) (4)46
organizations that fulfill most, if not all, of these criteria on their
face without compromising the organization's protected rights to
speech.47  However, since physical and financial separation is
determined on a vague case-by-case basis, the requirements
arguably invite a spectrum of government regulation that, once
applied, could span from the reasonable to the unconstitutional.
Legal Services Corporation insisted that the plaintiff-grantees in
Velazquez keep completely separate equipment and physical
premises, and while it would allow grantees to share some staff, it
43. Velazquez II, 164 F.3d at 767.
44. 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (declaring unconstitutional a restriction
prohibiting a legal aid attorney representing a client in a welfare case from
challenging the validity of the law).
45. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F. Supp. 2d 566
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
46. Most 501(c)(4) organizations operate "exclusively for the promotion
of social welfare." I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2005). As such, they may engage in
certain activities, such as lobbying, from which a 501(c)(3) organization is
generally restricted. 501(c)(4) organizations do not enjoy the same level of tax
exemption that 501(c)(3) organizations do. See generally JOHN FRANCIS
REILLY, CARTER C. HULL, AND BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, IRC 501(c)(4)
ORGANIZATIONS (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopiciO
3.pdf (general article on 501(c)(4) organizations published by the IRS for
training purposes only).
47. Cf. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
544 n.6 (1983) (explaining how IRS requirements for separation between
501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) affiliates are not unduly burdensome).
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would not permit 100% overlap.48 In Velazquez IV, the plaintiffs,
and more importantly the district court, felt that applying the
regulations in this manner crossed the line into the realm of the
impermissible;9 that is, this case by case application of the
requirements did not "ensure that the rules adopted by LSC will
give birth to viable alternative channels [for protected speech], and
not place unjustifiable obstacles in the path of their creation."5 °
LSC appealed, and in Velazquez V, the Second Circuit must
decide whether the LSC's current program integrity requirements,
as-applied, violate the First Amendment rights of both the grantees
and the non-federal donors of those grantees by imposing
unjustified "onerous fiscal, administrative and programmatic costs
... on protected speech?"
5
1
II. LINES IN THE SAND: SEEKING A STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Velazquez 11, the Second Circuit indicated two possible
standards of review to determine the constitutionality of the LSC
program integrity requirements. First, the court stated that "in
appropriate circumstances, Congress may burden the First
Amendment rights of recipients of governmental benefits if the
recipients are left with adequate alternative channels for protected
expression., 52  Second, the court also said that any grantee
demonstrating that the 1996 restrictions unduly burdened its
capacity to engage in protected First Amendment activity is free to
bring an as-applied challenge.5 3 Not surprisingly, LSC latched on to
48. Velazquez IV, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 574-79.
49. Id. at 610-13.
50. Id. at 611.
51. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff-Cross-
Appellants at 27, Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 05-0340 (2d Cir. June
27, 2005).
52. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez I/), 164 F.3d 757, 766 (2d
Cir. 1999).
53. Id. at 767.
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the former adequate alternative standard,m and the plaintiffs, the
undue burden standard.55
The Second Circuit's mixed signals do not come from thin
air. Indeed, a survey of Supreme Court decisions show both
confusing language and a divergence of facts that make gleaning a
consistent test more akin to auguring tea leaves.56 The elusive
doctrine of permissible non-subsidies further complicates the
matter.
Professor Kathleen Sullivan, in her seminal essay,
Unconstitutional Conditions,5 states that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine "holds that government may not grant a benefit
on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit
altogether."5" The doctrine is built on the foundation that
"government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly."59
But, there is a tension in modern jurisprudence between what the
United States Supreme Court perceives to be a "permissible
refusal[] to subsidize ' ' 0 (hereinafter "permissible non-subsidy")
61
which is not subject to an unconstitutional conditions inquiry, and
61"impermissible penalties," which are subject to such inquiry.
Good examples of permissible non-subsidies can be found
in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington 6' and Rust
v. Sullivan.6 In Taxation With Representation, a 501(c)(3)
organization challenged federal limits on lobbying placed upon tax-
54. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 9, at 41.
55. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellants and Plaintiff-Cross-
Appellants, supra note 51, at 39.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 60-80.
57. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1464.
61. This term is also derived from Professor Sullivan. Id. at 1499.
62. Id. For more on distinguishing unconstitutional conditions from
permissible non-subsidies, see infra Part III.
63. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
64. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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exempt organizations.6' The challenge failed as the Court
determined that: "Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as
extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that non profit
organizations undertake to promote the public welfare." In Rust,
the Court held that regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services prohibiting abortion related activity by
family planning grantees withstood a facial First Amendment
challenge as they also reflected permissible non-subsidies. 67 The
Court stated that "Congress has merely refused to fund such
activities out of the public fisc, and the Secretary has simply
required a certain degree of separation ... in order to ensure the
integrity of the federally funded program."' Thus, a permissible
non-subsidy is a line drawn in the sand to ensure that federal funds
do not subsidize, directly or indirectly, activities that Congress does
not wish to support. Since Congress is not obligated to fund an
activity, First Amendment rights such as lobbying or the free
expression associated with a family planning clinic are not
implicated.
Unfortunately, the basic notion of a permissible non-subsidy
has complicating effects on the standard of review in
unconstitutional condition cases. In the as-applied challenge
rejected in Taxation With Representation, the Court held that
Congress was not imposing an unconstitutional condition in limiting
the lobbying of 501(c)(3) organizations; rather, it was exercising a
permissible non-subsidy.69 As a key component of its analysis, the
Court noted that the plaintiff nonprofit organization could lobby
through an affiliated 501(c)(4) organization. The Court, in a
footnote, also acknowledged that the requirements thereof
(separate incorporation and separate records) were not "unduly
burdensome., 70 Thus, the Court implied, but did not hold, that an
65. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 542.
66. Id. at 544.
67. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-200.
68. Id. at 198.
69. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544.
70. Id. at 544 n.6. The Court did not provide examples of what would be
unduly burdensome.
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undue burden may bring a permissible non-subsidy case into the
realm of unconstitutional conditions.
The following year, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California,7' the Court held that federal broadcast regulations
71amounted to an unconstitutional condition as-applied. In a case
that involved federal regulations that prohibited governmentally
subsidized public television stations from using private dollars to
editorialize, the Court stated that to be constitutional under the
73First Amendment, the regulations must be "narrowly tailored to
further a substantial government interest." 74  In finding the
considered regulations overbroad, the Court held that the "ban on
all editorializing ... far exceeds what is necessary to protect against
the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public from
assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent
the official view of the government., 75 However, the Court also
considered whether the regulations amounted to a permissible non-
subsidy similar to those found in Taxation With Representation.76
The Court rejected this argument, but suggested that if Congress
authorized an affiliate organization similar to the 501(c)(4) in
Taxation With Representation, "such a statutory mechanism would
plainly be valid ....
The language in these decisions is murky, circular, and
subject to at least two possible interpretations. The first
interpretation is that there is a strict dichotomy between
unconstitutional conditions and permissible non-subsidies. That is,
if a restriction is not a permissible non-subsidy, it is an
unconstitutional condition. There is simply no further standard of
71. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The plaintiffs challenged a section of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1967 which forbade any "'noncommercial educational
broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation [for Public
Broadcasting]' to 'engage in editorializing."' Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 380-99.
73. The Court found that the restriction in question was "specifically
directed at a form of speech-namely, the expression of editorial opinion-
that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection." Id. at 381.
74. Id. at 380.
75. Id. at 395.
76. Id. at 400.
77. Id.
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review beyond whatever standard was employed to distinguish one
from the other. Thus, if the Second Circuit, in its as-applied
analysis, distinguishes the LSC program integrity requirements
from permissible non-subsidies, the plaintiffs win.
The second interpretation is that challenges based on
unconstitutional conditions require a two-part inquiry. The first
question is whether the challenged regulation or act is a permissible
non-subsidy or instead, a condition whose constitutionality needs to
be explored. If the condition needs to be explored, the second
question is whether the government's regulation passes
constitutional muster by being narrowly tailored to further a•78
substantial government interest. Through this lens, the Second
Circuit's signals in Velazquez H were not mixed at all. The court
applied the appropriate test to the question of whether the program
integrity requirements were actually permissible non-subsidies. 79
Finding that the requirements were non-subsidies, the court left
open the possibility that an as-applied challenge might bring
forward distinguishing facts to pull the requirements into the realm
of unconstitutional conditions. If so, the court indicated a second
standard of review: an undue burden test.8°
In either case, whether a challenged condition is a
permissible non-subsidy is a decisive factor in determining its
constitutionality. A further exploration of permissible non-
subsidies is warranted before arguing for one standard or the other.
III. A RUSTY RELIANCE: PERMISSIBLE NON-SUBSIDIES
ANALYZED
As mentioned above, Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington"' and Rust v. Sullivan"' provide the
touchstone examples of permissible non-subsidies. Not
78. Id. at 380.
79. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez I), 164 F.3d 757, 766 (2d
Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 767.
81. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
82. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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surprisingly, both Taxation With Representation and Rust are
important components in LSC's defense of its program integrity
requirements for two reasons: (1) the LSC regulations were based
on those that withstood the facial challenge in Rust and are
"virtually identical,"83 and (2) in Velazquez II, the Second Circuit
leaned heavily on Taxation With Representation in holding the
program integrity requirements facially constitutional. 8 Given
these two factors, it would seem that the cards are stacked in favor
of LSC. However, when it opened the door for an as-applied
challenge, the Second Circuit indicated its willingness to consider
ways in which the facts of Velazquez could be distinguished from
other permissible non-subsidies."' Thus, the Second Circuit has
suggested that any court considering an as-applied unconstitutional
conditions challenge must ask whether the facts are sufficiently
distinguishable from Rust and Taxation With Representation. If so,
it appears that an actual application of a regulation can create an
unconstitutional condition not found in the analysis of facial
challenges.
Given the similarities between the regulations at issue in
Velazquez and Rust, 6 Rust is the best place to begin such analysis.
Rust involved a facial challenge to newly implemented regulations
limiting the ability of Department of Health and Human Services
Title X grantees "to engage in abortion-related activities." '87
Among the regulations at issue were requirements for projects to
"be organized so that they are 'physically and financially separate'
from prohibited abortion activities. ' The Secretary could make a
83. Velazquez 11, 164 F.3d at 767.
84. Id. at 766-67. This court also found certain suggestions made by the
United States Supreme Court in FCC v. League of Women Voters of
California, 648 U.S. 364 (1984) to be persuasive. Id. at 767. See discussion
infra note 104 and accompanying text.
85. Velazquez II, 164 F.3d at 767. "It may be .. . that the program
integrity rules will, in the case of some recipients, prove unduly burdensome
and inadequately justified .... And it may be ... that the program integrity
requirements may prove especially burdensome in the context of legal
services." Id.
86. See supra note 83.
87. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178.
88. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
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"case-by-case determination of objective integrity and
independence" aided by "a list of non-exclusive factors., 89 Plaintiffs
argued that these regulations amounted to an unconstitutional
condition of a receipt of funds. 0 The United States Supreme Court
dismissed this argument, stating:
[T]he Government is not denying a benefit to
anyone, but is instead simply insisting that
public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized. The Secretary's
regulations do not force the Title X grantee to
give up abortion-related speech; they merely
require that the grantee keep such activities
separate and distinct from Title X activities. 9'
The Court also noted that the grantee still possessed
avenues for its protected, and now separated, speech: "[t]he Title X
grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related
services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to
conduct those activities through programs that are separate and
independent from the project that receives Title X funds." 9
Furthermore, "employees remain free . . . to pursue abortion-
related activities when they are not acting under the auspices of the
Title X project." 93 Essentially, the Court argued that "Title X
subsidies are just that, subsidies. The recipient is in no way
compelled to operate a Title X project; to avoid the force of the
regulation, it can simply decline the subsidy." 94 Furthermore, it
notes, "[t]he regulations are limited to Title X funds; the recipient
remains free to use private, non-Title X funds to finance abortion-
related activities." 95
89. Id. at 181.
90. Id. at 196.
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 199 n.5.
95. Id.
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A. Distinguishing Permissible Non-subsidies from Unconstitutional
Conditions
There are at least four somewhat interrelated ways in which
Velazquez V and other similar cases can be distinguished from the
archetypical permissible non-subsidy presented by Rust. First, an
as-applied challenge is more nuanced and complicated then the all
or nothing analysis of the facial challenge in Rust. Second, Rust
makes an important differentiation between restrictions on
programs and restrictions on a grant recipient. Third, donors have
directly joined the litigation. Fourth, Velazquez V calls into
consideration the broader purposes and functions of the nonprofit
sector as a whole.
1. The As-Applied Context
First, the language in Rust must be analyzed in the context
of the issue in front of the Court - a facial First Amendment
challenge. The Court notes at the outset the heavy burden placed
upon plaintiffs who facially challenge the constitutionality of a
legislative act: "[T]he challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid." 96 This
stark all-or-nothing test allows the Court to view the case through a
lens of simplicity97 that is inappropriate for the question at hand in
Velazquez V. The question in Velazquez V is not whether the
program integrity requirements unconstitutionally restrict speech in
all possible scenarios but whether they do so in practice. The
simplicity of the facial test is eroded by the practical realities that
speech is not turned on and off like a switch; rather, at some point
the burdens placed on speech effectively quash it. For example, in
practice, there are real costs to regulations requiring the creation of
a separate corporation, maintenance of separate offices and files,
separate equipment and separate staff. At some point, those costs
96. Id. at 183 (citation omitted).
97. The word "simply" appears seven times in the Court's analysis of the
unconstitutional condition claim, twice in tandem with "merely." Id. at 196-
201; see, e.g., supra notes 68, 91-92, 94 and accompanying text.
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may weigh heavily on an organization if not exceed its capacity
altogether. A more nuanced as-applied analysis inquires at what
point this occurs. In Velazquez IV, the court found that the costs of
creating a separate corporation in a separate location without
sharing equipment and staff would cost Queens Legal Services
$200,000, South Brooklyn Legal Services ("SBLS") at least
$380,000 and Farmworker Legal Services $130,000 for the first year
98and $80,000 thereafter. When balancing these costs against the
government interests protected by the regulations, the court found
the costs to be too weighty.
2. The Recipient/Program Distinction
Second, Rust explicitly distinguishes between
unconstitutional conditions and permissible non-subsidies. After
placing Title X restrictions outside of the unconstitutional
conditions box, the Court clarified an important defining factor for
the cases that remain, or wish to remain, inside the box. "In
contrast, our 'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations
in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of
the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus
effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program."1°°
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Rust were in "no way 'barred from
using even wholly private funds to finance' its pro-abortion
activities outside the Title X program. The regulations are limited
to Title X funds; the recipient remains free to use private, non-Title
X funds to finance abortion-related activities. '"10' Thus, the Court is
drawing a clear distinction between restrictions that attach to the
implementation of a grant or subsidy and those that extend beyond
the specified grant related activity.
98. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F. Supp. 2d 566,
604-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
99. Id. at 610-13.
100. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 199 n.5 (citation omitted).
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But that line is not so clear. In the simplistic analysis of a
facial challenge, "never the twain shall meet."' 2  In practical
application, however, it is often difficult to distinguish between a
restriction that attaches to a program and one that attaches to a
recipient as a whole.' °3 For example, if an organization exists to
provide one service, does a restriction on a federal subsidy for that
service also attach to the organization de facto? '°4  More
importantly, just as grant dollars subsidize an organization, grant
restrictions may have costs that an organization must somehow
bear. In Rust, the Court held that the government was "simply
insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they
were authorized."'0 5 Theoretically, such insistence is attached to the
program grant, but its costs may require the expenditure of already
102. 6 RUDYARD KIPLING, The Ballad of East and West, COMPACr
EDITION OF RUDYARD KIPLING 61 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1925) (1896).
103. The Court has complicated things with its own imprecise language.
The Court interchangeably uses the words "grant" and "subsidy." Rust, 500
U.S. 173 passim. But the two words have very different connotations. The
subsidy an organization receives from tax exemption, for example, has a very
different operational effect than a programmatic grant.
104. This question may be in part answered by FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The issue in that case was whether
the federal government could attach a condition to federal funding of public
broadcasting stations forbidding them from "'engag[ing] in editorializing."'
Id. at 366 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 399). In holding that such was an
unconstitutional condition, the Court stated, "[t]he station has no way of
limiting the use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities, and, more
importantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its
editorial activity." Id. at 400. However, the Court did suggest that Congress
could require separation through an affiliate. Id. at 399-400 (discussing Regan
v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983));
see also Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1465. On the other hand, it is possible to
parse broad program activity into smaller parts thereby undermining any
claim that a restriction on a smaller subset of activity applies to the broader
activity as a whole. For instance, taking the hypothetical of Language for Life
and the government restriction, see supra note 1, one can make the valid
argument that while the organization exists to provide English as a Second
Language, the federal government would not be restricting the teaching of
ESL to populations other than undocumented immigrants.
105. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
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scarce resources from other services and sources.'0 At some point,
these will extend well beyond a program budget into the coffers of
the recipient, thereby burdening its protected right to expression.
For example, in Velazquez IV, the court found that it would cost at
least $380,000 a year for SBLS to adhere to the program integrity
requirements. 1°7 This figure represented 8% of the organization's
budget and the diverted resources would result in the organization
serving 500 fewer clients, and with fewer staff.' 8 Thus, it can be
argued that the LSC program integrity requirements do not solely
restrict the federally funded activity; they have "placed a condition
on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program
or service . . . ." ' Therefore, in Velazquez V, the court must
answer whether, in applying the program integrity requirements,
the government "effectively prohibit[ed] the recipient from
engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program." ° When, as in this case, the costs to plaintiffs
may be measured not only in hundreds of thousands of dollars, but
also in hundreds of clients, the answer to this inquiry should be
affirmative.
However, Taxation With Representation adds another layer
to this analysis. Since the subsidy involved in Taxation was the
organization's tax exempt status, it follows that the restrictions on
lobbying attached to the recipient of the subsidy as a whole rather
than a particular program of the recipient. Yet, the Court ruled
that the lobbying restriction was not an unconstitutional condition
because the organization had outlets for its protected speech
through a 501(c)(4) organization.I1  Thus, a restriction that is
106. For discussion on First Amendment rights of donors, see infra Part
III.A.3.
107. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F. Supp. 2d 566,
606 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
111. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544-
45 (1983). The Court also suggested as much in FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), albeit from a different posture. In
that case, the Court held that certain restrictions attached to federal public
broadcasting funding were unconstitutional conditions but noted that they
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attached to the recipient of a subsidy as a whole may also be found
to be constitutional if it does not "condition that the beneficiary
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
withhold that benefit altogether."' I2 But the Court also suggested
that the existence of alternate outlets for protected speech is not
the sole determining factor of the constitutionality of a condition
attached to an organizational subsidy. In a footnote, the Court
dismissed arguments that creating a 501(c)(4) could become
overbearing, but not because such was an illegitimate argument.'
3
Rather, the Court dismissed those arguments because "[t]he IRS
apparently requires only that the two groups be separately
incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax
deductible contributions are not used to pay for lobbying. This is
not unduly burdensome.""
4
Thus, plaintiffs, like those in Velazquez V, can distinguish a
set of restrictions from permissible non-subsidies in two ways. First,
plaintiffs can prove that the restrictions go beyond limited program
activity and attach to the organization as a whole. If so, plaintiffs
can then prove that either (a) there is no alternate outlet for the
protected speech, or (b) the alternate outlet is unduly burdensome.
3. The First Amendment Rights of Donors
The third factor that distinguishes Velazquez V from the
archetypical permissible non-subsidy found in Rust is the presence
of donors. The Rust opinion did in fact address interests of donors,
but in that case donors were providing matching dollars to a federal115
program. It was easy there for the Court to dismiss any of their
claims within the framework of permissible non-subsidies by stating
would be valid if "Congress were to . . . permit[] ... stations to establish
'affiliate' organizations which could then use the station's facilities to
editorialize with nonfederal funds...." Id. at 400.
112. Sullivan, supra note 57, at 1415.
113. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544 n.6.
114. Id. Compare these requirements, and their consequent costs, to the
LSC program integrity requirements mandating physical and financial
separation, including separation of personnel and facilities. See supra notes
22-25 and accompanying text.
115. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5.
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that grantees "voluntarily consent[ed] to any restrictions placed on
any matching funds or grant-related income."11 6 In Velazquez V,
there is no evidence that donations are simply matching dollars to a
federal program; rather, it appears that donations were made to
organizations as a whole to support broader program activities."7
But in order for that to matter, donors must have a valid
First Amendment interest in the activity of the nonprofit
organizations they support - and they do as evidenced by the law of
charitable solicitation. In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Env't,"8 the Court held that the act of charitable solicitation
"involve[s] a variety of speech interests - communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes - that are within the protection of the
First Amendment." 9 It follows that if a donor responds to such a
solicitation, the same interests are invoked. Indeed the court
implied as much in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ.
Fund, Inc.,"2 stating that a "contribution in response to a request
for funds functions as a general expression of support for the
recipient and its views."' 2 ' Furthermore, it follows that the
protections of the First Amendment extend beyond the mere act of
giving into the expectations of the gift itself. As Justice Breyer
stated in his concurrence to a case concerning a challenge to
campaign finance law, "a decision to contribute money to a
campaign is a matter of First Amendment concern - not because
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 13 (asserting the intentions of the New
York Foundation when providing a grant to South Brooklyn Legal Services).
118. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). This case involved a challenge to an ordinance
enacted by the Village of Schaumburg prohibiting charitable solicitation by
"organizations that do not use at least 75 percent of their receipts for
'charitable purposes."' Id. at 622 (quoting SCHAUMBURG VILLAGE, ILL., CODE
§ 22-20(g) (1975)).
119. Id. at 632; see also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781
(1988) (finding that the North Carolina Charitable Solicitation violated the
First Amendment rights of charities).
120. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). In this case, various legal defense funds
challenged their exclusion from the Combined Federal Campaign, a federal
workplace giving program. Id. at 790.
121. Id. at 799.
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money is speech (it is not); but because it enables speech.' 22 It is no
great leap of faith or logic to analogize political campaign donations
to nonprofit donations, especially since many nonprofits advocate
political ideas. Thus, when the government interferes with the
protected speech of a nonprofit, it is implicating the First
Amendment rights of the donors who enable that speech through
their donations. 12
For instance, the New York Foundation, a plaintiff in
Velazquez V, made a grant to SBLS to support that organization's
efforts in working with family daycare provider networks. 124 Soon,
SBLS discovered that the city was significantly underpaying
daycare providers, but a full remedy of the situation required a class
action suit, which the organization was prevented from filing
because of LSC regulations in spite of the New York Foundation's
support. 25 In order to be able to engage in this activity, SBLS
would have to create a separate affiliate organization at an
additional cost of at least $380,000.126 By burdening the protected
speech of the nonprofit, the government also burdened the
protected speech of the donor whose contribution was intended to
enable the speech. 
27
122. Nixon v. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
123. On a corollary note, donors have high expectations of their gifts. In
a recent Zogby poll, 72.4% of those polled "said that when a nonprofit
organization uses money 'for a purpose other than the one for which it was
given,' the managers of the recipient organization 'should be held legally or
criminally liable for acting in a fraudulent manner."' Zogby International,
Donor Intent Key to Healthy Charitable Giving Climate, New Poll Finds, Dec.
19, 2005, http://www.zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.dbm?ID=12445.
124. Lee, supra note 13.
125. Id.
126. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez VI), 349 F. Supp. 2d
566, 606 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
127. There are two counterarguments to this assertion. The first is that
another organization can pick up the lawsuit, fulfilling the expectation of the
donor. But it would seem that if two political candidates shared identical
platforms and parties, and if one candidate won a primary nomination due to
restriction on the speech of the other, no court would hold that it was in
essence a harmless error. The same reasoning applies to the donor/charity
context. The second counterargument is that if other donors came up with the
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Thus, if the donors are engaged in protected activity by
contributing to the organization's program activity as a whole,
rather than simply matching funds to a federally defined program,
any court should take their interests into account."" A court will
have a difficult time reconciling a heavy burden on the First
Amendment interests of donors with a finding of a permissible non-
subsidy. This will be an especially difficult reconciliation if the
court first finds that the costs of the restriction extend beyond the
federally funded program and attach to the organization, as
discussed above. 9
4. The Broader Purpose and Function of the Nonprofit Sector
Finally, the language in Rust also suggests another way in
which Velazquez V can be distinguished by consideration of the
broader purposes and functions of the nonprofit sector as a whole.
In further describing traits of cases in the unconstitutional
conditions box, the Court writes:
Similarly, we have recognized that the
university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of
our society that the Government's ability to
control speech within that sphere by means of
conditions attached to the expenditure of
Government funds is restricted by the
$380,000 to create the affiliate organization, then the original donor's First
Amendment interests would not be burdened at all. While in theory this
seems to be true, I will defer to development officers and major donors to
argue the possibility of theory being realized.
128. An interesting question is what action by a donor constitutes
protected speech? Logically, it would seem that simply responding to a
solicitation would be enough. It would also follow that if a donor gives
proactively, a concomitant verbal or written statement of support might also
be required. In the case of the New Foundation's grant to SBLS, such would
be the grant agreement and/or grant application.
129. Although it is difficult to imagine a scenario where this was not the
case.
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vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the
130First Amendment ....
The Court speculated that circumstances analogous to a
university setting could call the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
into action, but it found reasons to avoid deciding whether the
doctor/patient relationship (where a doctor might have First
Amendment rights to discuss abortion with a patient) provided
such an analogy."' However, the Second Circuit might find such an
analogy in Velazquez, not through the lawyer/client relationship,
but in the context of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The question
should be asked whether a nonprofit, like a university, "is a
traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the
functioning of our society"'132 that the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine applies.
There are two obvious flaws in such an analogy. As a subset
of the nonprofit sector, universities share some core common goals
and functions within society, whereas an arts organization is likely
to have a very different mission, constituency, and function than a
legal services organization. Furthermore, if the sector did represent
such a "traditional sphere," then the courts would have already
recognized such. While both of these points stand, they do not
necessarily end the argument.
First, as previously demonstrated,' 3  the nonprofit sector is
also a traditional sphere of free expression. The Schaumburg
assertion that solicitation invokes a "variety of speech interests -
communication of information, the dissemination and propagation
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes - that are within the
protection of the First Amendment,"'3 is neither timid nor flippant.
If the solicitation of funds alone represents these interests, it
follows that program activity, the very product of the nonprofit,
must also, if not to an even greater degree.
130. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 605-06 (1967)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See supra Part III.A.3.
134. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,
632 (1980).
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Second, the nonprofit sector is fundamental to the
functioning of our society as represented by its breadth and
impact."' There are now an estimated 1.3 million nonprofit• • 136 137
organizations, employing 9% of the United States workforce.
Each year, private donors give $207 billion to support their favorite
organizations, and corporations and private foundations add
another $41 billion.'3 The capacity of the sector is supplemented by
$9 million worth of volunteer hours.139 All of these resources are
brought to bear on a range of social goods, including museums,
symphonies, community theaters, private colleges and universities,
independent elementary and secondary schools, noncommercial
research institutions, zoos, land protection groups, hospitals, public
clinics, housing and shelter providers, sport and recreation
programs, overseas relief and development assistance
organizations, private and community foundations, civil rights
organizations, and houses of worship."04
Perhaps more importantly, the sector exists to fill the gaps
created by a free market and government, often in combination
with representatives from both of these sectors.' 4' For example,
nonprofit organizations played a vital role in immediate relief after
Hurricane Katrina and will continue to play an integral role in
reconstruction. 42
135. See generally INDEPENDENT SEcTOR, supra note 2, at 9-12
(exploring the role and scope of the nonprofit sector in the United States).
136. Id. at 10-11.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 11.
141. See LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
PRIMER 11-13 (The Foundation Center 2d ed. 1999) (1992).
142. For instance, compare the roles of two organizations created to aid
in local reconstruction and relief: the Louisiana Recovery Authority, a
governmental organization "established within the Military Department,
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness," Exec. Order No.
KBB 2005 - 63, 2005 Bill Text LA E.O. 84 (2005), available at
http://www.gov.state.la.us/assets/docs/ExecutiveOrders/LouisianaRecoveryA
uthority-exec-order.pdf, and the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, a
nonprofit charitable foundation "established in order to help provide
assistance to Louisiana citizens in need through a network of Louisiana
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Since most nonprofit organizations are corporations, like
their for-profit counterparts, they are examples of private
enterprises. But unlike their money-making mirrors, these
corporations receive a vital government subsidy - their 501(c)(3)
status. 143 Thus, the formation of these nonprofit enterprises is a
nexus of private and government interests which has developed as a
response fundamental to the functioning of our society.'4
The nonprofit sector reflects private and governmental
interests, both of which must be protected. Nowhere does the
history of the nonprofit sector suggest that the government interests
supersede, as a matter of practice, principal, or law, those of private
citizenry. If anything, as the discussion herein indicates, it suggests
the contrary.' 45  The nonprofit sector as a whole is vital to the
functioning of our society - socially, civically, and economically,
and First Amendment freedoms of speech and expression should
apply. Therefore, government action to control the speech of
charities and non-profit agencies." Press Release, Louisiana Disaster Relief
Foundation, Civic & Community Leaders Tapped for Louisiana Disaster
Recovery Foundation (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http:www.louisianahelp.org/
pressrelease.html (last visited March 7, 2006). The LRA is a state agency that
coordinates the response of various tax supported government agencies and
units whereas the foundation was created to leverage private dollars to enable
the direct relief and reconstruction work of private nonprofits. Given the
enormity of the reconstruction, neither alone would be sufficient.
143. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2005). Most 501(c)(3) organizations receive a
further subsidy in that they qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions.
I.R.C. § 170 (2005).
144. Admittedly, the Court has some difficulty with this concept.
Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983)
(arguing that nonprofit tax exemption is based on the organization's service to
the public interest and must be aligned with "community conscience" - that is,
almost an extension of government), with id. at 608-10 (Powell, J., concurring)
(countering that nonprofits "'contribute[] to the diversity of association,
viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society"') (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
145. Indeed, such a concern is an integral component of Professor
Sullivan's systemic theory of unconstitutional conditions. Sullivan, supra note
57, at 1421 ("Whatever the reason to preserve a realm of private autonomy
from government encroachment, unconstitutional conditions present the same
structural threat to that realm: they permit circumvention of existing
constitutional restraints on direct regulation.").
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nonprofit organizations, such as the plaintiff legal services agencies
in Velazquez, should receive the same level of scrutiny as would be
given in the context of universities.
IV. THE LINE REDRAWN: A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE
JURISPRUDENCE
The above critical exploration of what is and what is not a
permissible non-subsidy directly informs the answer to the question
posed earlier: is there a line, and if so, where is it? In Rust v.. 147
Sullivan,4 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,147
the Velazquez quintet, and the hypothetical case of Language for
Life, the linchpin is permissible non-subsidy. If a challenged
condition is a permissible non-subsidy, its constitutionality will be
upheld. 148 There is a strict dichotomy between unconstitutional
conditions and permissible non-subsidies, and a standard of review
is employed in each case to distinguish one from the other. Given
the all or nothing nature of a facial review, any such battleground
should be in as-applied challenges where there is a clear standard of
review - to balance the legitimate interests of the government
against the protected free expression of nonprofit sectors. A
condition can be distinguished from a permissible non-subsidy by
balancing the government's interests in protecting its desire to not
subsidize certain activity against the costs of that condition to one
or more of the following: (1) the First Amendment rights of the
149organization; (2) the First Amendment rights of donors to that
organization; and, (3) the function of the nonprofit sector as a
traditional sphere of free expression. Applying this standard would
be a fact specific inquiry. Courts would determine the interest the
government seeks to protect, the actual costs to the organization of
protecting that interest in the prescribed way, the valid expectation
of donors in terms of free expression and the costs to that
146. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
147. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540
(1983).
14& See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp. (Velazquez IV), 349 F.
Supp. 2d 566, 610-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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expectation, and the chilling effect of any regulation on expression
within the nonprofit sector as a whole.
Measuring the costs to the organization is probably the
simplest inquiry. For example, the court in Velazquez IV quantified
the costs of the LSC program integrity requirements by looking at
the increased expense budget and decreased number of clients
served. The more difficult question is just how large the costs
must be to tip the scale to unconstitutionality. A plaintiff's claim is
strengthened if both types of costs are present. For example, the
cost of the LSC program integrity requirements to South Brooklyn
Legal Services was approximately 8% of its budget and 500 fewer
clients served, which seemed to be enough for the court in
Velazquez IV. 5
Furthermore, given the quantified costs to the organization,
it may not be difficult to derive the real costs to donors and what
those costs mean to the both the donors' and the organizations'
First Amendment interests. For example, with the right data, the
court could determine how much more private donors would have
to give in order to enable the expression of the donor and the
organization burdened with the implementation of the challenged
restriction. The difference between that figure and what the donors
would need to give to enable the organization to conduct the
protected activity without the challenged restriction would be the
quantifiable costs to the donors. Obviously, the larger the cost in
both real dollars and as a percentage of an overall budget, the
greater the burden placed on the donors' protected speech.
The most difficult inquiry is determining to what extent any
challenged regulation has on a nonprofit's ability, or that of the
nonprofit sector, to serve as a traditional sphere of free expression.
Having good data on the costs to the organization and the donor
will be helpful, as the higher the costs, the greater the chilling effect
on the speech. But perhaps more important is the aggregate costs
of the challenged regulation to an entire class of organizations. For
instance, in the case of legal service agencies, many such
organizations are impacted by the same government regulations.
150. Velazquez IV, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 604-07.
151. Id. at 606.
NONPROFIT ORGANIZA TIONS
Indeed, Madeline Lee of the New York Foundation argues, "[i]n
practice, this wasteful and duplicative alternative [of establishing
separate organizations with separate facilities and staff] is
impossible. Of the approximately 200 legal services programs
nationwide, only a handful of them have even attempted to set up
such facilities, and those that have done so have struggled. 1 12 Thus,
if such regulations are given effect, the costs are not just felt by
individual organizations, but to an entire class of nonprofit
organizations, chilling speech in an otherwise traditional sphere of
free expression.
The benefits of this proposed standard are worth repeating.
The government ought to be able to attach conditions to its grants,
and nonprofit organizations and donors ought to have their First
Amendment rights protected. These interests are bound to collide,
and at times it will be easy to tell which is superior. This standard
provides the courts the nuanced guidance needed when the task is
not so easy.
CONCLUSION
In Velazquez V, the Second Circuit should find that the LSC
program integrity requirements are unconstitutional as-applied.
The court has enough data on the high costs to the plaintiff
organizations in terms of both dollars and clients served to conclude
that the requirements place an excessive burden on the First
Amendment rights of the plaintiff organizations. Furthermore,
with a little more data, the court would likely find that the
government's interests also were not enough to overcome the
burden placed on the First Amendment rights of the donors.
Finally, if Madeline Lee is correct, 53 the court should recognize the
aggregate chilling effect that the program integrity requirements
have on a traditional sphere of free expression.
The balancing test proposed in this Note would achieve the
proper balance between legitimate government interests and
protected free expression of nonprofit sectors. The clumsiness with
152. Lee, supra note 13, at 24.
153. Id., see also text accompanying supra note 13.
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which the courts have developed and applied the doctrine of
permissible non-subsidies threatens to skew the balance toward the
government and allow it to "do indirectly what it may not do
directly."154 If the program integrity requirements are given effect,
a nonprofit organization will not be able to serve the clients it so
desires, and it cannot express or defend its own ideas, even with
private dollars. Furthermore, the government would be nullifying
any support for those ideas that private citizens expected to enable
with their charitable donations, as well as altogether limiting the
donors' marketplace for ideas. The costs of such an imbalance are
not just felt by nonprofit organizations, but by society as a whole.
The First Amendment demands that the balance be maintained.
154. Sullivan, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
